Browns Pass Rush: 2014 Season Primer

Week 1 of the 2014 NFL season has finally arrived! 2013 may be ancient history, but game film from last season can still tell us many things about what to expect from teams and players this year. With that in mind, I studied the tape of the following 2013 Browns games: week 1 vs. the Miami Dolphins, week 4 vs. the Cincinnati Bengals, week 9 vs. the Baltimore Ravens, week 13 vs. the Jacksonville Jaguars, and week 17 vs. the Pittsburgh Steelers. In this study, I graded the pass rush of each Browns player that rushed the passer on every play in each of these five games (with the exception of non-qualifying plays, which I will explain in the "Methodology" section below).

I then compiled the statistics of how frequently each player received a particular grade and assigned each player a Pass Rush Score. This is a percentage rating showing how often the pass rusher received a positive grade: how often he pressured the pocket. (Note: by "pressures" I am not referring to the football statistic with that name, I am talking about how often the pass rusher received an "Impact" or "Effective" grade, as I describe below in "The Grades" section.)

I also graded the team's total success of the pass rush on each play. By that, I mean that I selected the highest amount of pressure applied by any player on that play and assigned that as the defense's pass rush grade for that play. Thus, each player involved in the pass rush on that play received two separate grades: an individual grade for the pressure they applied personally and also a team grade for the pressure that the team applied on a play in which they rushed the passer.

Why do this? Some players see a lot of double teams. Some open up lanes for other rushers. Some face off against opposing teams' best pass protectors while their teammates get easier matchups. For these reasons, I assigned each player a Composite Pass Rush Score to account for how his pass rush opens up opportunities for his teammates.

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(I discuss the methods I used first. If you just want the results of the study, skip down to "The 2013 Scores" section about 2/3 of the way to the end of the article.)

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Methodology

Purpose - This study is not focused on the outcome of the play but of the quality of the pass rush.

• Sometimes an extremely high quality rush can be negated by a quick "hot read" or checkdown and, conversely, sometimes a very mediocre pass rush can result in a sack due to great coverage in the secondary.
• The variable of QB play is removed. Attention is only given to the pass rush attempt itself. Quarterbacks are not all created equal and different ones will be affected by and respond to the same pass rush differently. Some QB's are quicker getting the ball out of their hands. Some are more phased by pressure than others. Some can read the defense and deliver an accurate pass with a defender baring down on them or even draped all over them. Since we are looking at the rush itself and not the outcome of the play -- which is influence by many other variables -- we can talk about what degree of success a pass rusher had on any given play...in it's own right.
• The data presented in this study does not account for the differences in talent, skill, and technique among offensive linemen and other pass protectors. It also does not account for the effect of individual player matchups, be they favorable or unfavorable.
• Grades and scores are contextual. A player with much better teammates around him will likely rack up much higher team, and likely also individual, scores. Therefore, scores and grades should be taken for what they are intended to represent: how effective the player was pass rushing on his particular team at that particular time. Comparisons between the scores of players on different teams should be taken with this grain of salt: the score represents that player on that team, if the situation is changed the production may change as well.

Non-Qualifying Plays - In general, all plays in which a player rushes the passer in a graded game are considered. In particular, there are several exceptions including:

• Plays where player is given another assignment to execute before his rush such as chipping a tight end or back at the line.
• Plays where a player simulates a rush and then drops into zone coverage. However, plays where a player attempts a rush, is blocked, breaks off his rush, and attempts to bat down the pass at the line do qualify.
• When a player is given a QB containment assignment or is assigned to extremely exaggerate the width of his rush to draw his blocker away and create a lane for other rushers, it is not counted as a true pass rush attempt. (This is uncommon but does occur, where edge rusher intentionally ends up ten yards wide of the original pocket to make extra room for B-gap rushers.)
• Play action passes are counted. Elaborate trick plays do not count, such as flea flickers, double handoffs or pitches that end in a throw, wildcat quarterback passes, etc. Bootlegs off outside zone run looks that leave a backside rusher free are also excluded.
• One-step drop passes and other extremely quick passes are excluded.

QB's clock - Comes from the idea that a quarterback should have a clock in his head that tells him he's holding onto the ball too long and needs to get rid of it. (The general consensus is that a QB's clock is just over 3 seconds and after that point the ball should either be out or the quarterback should expect the rush.) In this study, I use "QB's clock" as a term for the time the quarterback has in a comfortable pocket to make a decision/play. I grade the pass rush based on whether it influences the integrity of the pocket (and thus, the QB's clock) and in how timely of a fashion it does so.

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The Grades

IMPACT = Pass rush ends QB's clock.

• The best rating for a pass rush.
• Pass rush that gets home.
• Either forces QB to make split-second decision or denies him even that chance.
• Many sacks fall in this category.
• Incompletions: forced throwaways, grounding.
• Also includes passes batted down at the line.
• Also early penetration into the backfield that forces QB off his spot, forces him to scramble, etc.

EFFECTIVE = Pass rush shortens QB's clock.

• The second best rating for a pass rush attempt. These plays are the bread and butter of a defense, as they limit the quarterback's ability to pick apart the coverage and often force him to settle for suboptimal throws.
• Forces QB to cut short or speed up his process.
• A lot of incompletions, interceptions, and checkdowns are caused by this kind of pressure.
• May result in coverage sacks if DB's lock down their receivers.
• General rule of thumb: Rush affects pocket within the first 2-3 seconds or impacts it very strongly immediately thereafter.

ADEQUATE = Pass rush contains QB's clock.

• Forces quarterback to make a decision within the rhythm of play.
• QB does not have to hurry but doesn't have all day.
• Pass rusher comes free late...usually too late.
• This is a win for the blocker and a loss for the rusher, but it's not a blowout or domination.
• One common example is when an edge rusher attempts an outside speed rush but the offensive tackle is able to mirror his rush and force him too wide and deep, causing him to come free behind the pocket rather than turning the corner into it.
• These rushes can become big plays if the quarterback holds onto the ball too long.
• Generalization: This is when it takes roughly 4 seconds before the rush will get there.

INEFFECTIVE = Pass rush does not affect QB's clock.

• Pass rusher may be completely taken out of play by blocker.
• QB has "all day" and can take as much time as he needs; rusher applies no pressure.
• This is a blowout win for the blocker and loss for the rusher.
• Defenses can get gutted in the passing game if they have many plays with an Ineffective rush grade. Players with a high frequency of these individual grades may still be an asset to the pass rush if their team grades are much better (i.e. they have a high Composite Pass Rush Score).

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Pass Rush Scores and Composite Pass Rush Scores report how often a player/defensive unit generates an Impact or Effective pass rush.

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THE 2013 NUMBERS

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#99 OLB Paul Kruger:

Individual rush:
Impact 		23/111 = 20.7%
Effective 	31/111 = 27.9%
Adequate	23/111 = 20.7%
Ineffective	34/111 = 30.6%
Pass Rush Score 54/111 = 48.6%

Team when he rushes:
Impact 		43/111 = 38.7%
Effective 	44/111 = 39.6%
Adequate	16/111 = 14.4%
Ineffective	 8/111 =  7.2%
Composite Pass Rush Score 87/111 = 78.4%

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#51 OLB Barkevious Mingo:

Individual rush:
Impact 		10/80 = 12.5%
Effective 	12/80 = 15%
Adequate	17/80 = 21.3%
Ineffective 	41/80 = 51.3%
Pass Rush Score 22/80 = 27.5%

Team when he rushes:
Impact 		28/80 = 35%
Effective 	29/80 = 36.3%
Adequate	12/80 = 15%
Ineffective	11/80 = 13.8%
Composite Pass Rush Score 57/80 = 71.3%

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#97 OLB Jabaal Sheard:

Individual rush:
Impact 		12/90 = 13.3%
Effective 	17/90 = 18.9%
Adequate	20/90 = 22.2%
Ineffective 	41/90 = 45.6%
Pass Rush Score 29/90 = 32.2%

Team when he rushes:
Impact 		37/90 = 41.1%
Effective 	37/90 = 41.1%
Adequate	 8/90 =  8.9%
Ineffective	 8/90 =  8.9%
Composite Pass Rush Score 74/90 = 82.2%

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#95 DE/DT Armonty Bryant:

Individual rush:
Impact 		 8/47 = 17%
Effective 	 7/47 = 14.9%
Adequate	 5/47 = 10.6%
Ineffective	27/47 = 57.4%
Pass Rush Score 15/47 = 31.9%

Team when he rushes:
Impact 		22/47 = 46.8%
Effective 	21/47 = 44.7%
Adequate	 3/47 =  6.4%
Ineffective	 1/47 =  2.1%
Composite Pass Rush Score 43/47 = 91.5%

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#92 DE/DT Desmond Bryant:

Individual rush:
Impact 		14/126 = 11.1%
Effective 	23/126 = 18.3%
Adequate	24/126 = 19%
Ineffective	65/126 = 51.6%
Pass Rush Score 37/126 = 29.4%

Team when he rushes:
Impact 		50/126 = 39.7%
Effective 	45/126 = 35.7%
Adequate	17/126 = 13.5%
Ineffective	14/126 = 11.1%
Composite Pass Rush Score 95/126 = 75.4%

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#90 DE/DT Billy Winn:

Individual rush:
Impact 		 6/51 = 11.7%
Effective 	 8/51 = 15.7%
Adequate	 8/51 = 15.7%
Ineffective	29/51 = 56.9%
Pass Rush Score 14/51 = 27.5%

Team when he rushes:
Impact 		21/51 = 41.2%
Effective 	16/51 = 31.4%
Adequate	 9/51 = 17.6%
Ineffective	 5/51 =  9.8%
Composite Pass Rush Score 37/51 = 72.5%

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#93 DT John Hughes:

Individual rush:
Impact 		 6/45 = 13.3%
Effective 	 4/45 =  8.9%
Adequate	 6/45 = 13.3%
Ineffective 	29/45 = 64.4%
Pass Rush Score 10/45 = 22.2%

Team when he rushes:
Impact 		16/45 = 35.6%
Effective 	13/45 = 28.9%
Adequate	14/45 = 31.1%
Ineffective	 2/45 =  4.4%
Composite Pass Rush Score 29/45 = 64.4%

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#98 DT Phil Taylor:

Individual rush:
Impact 		 4/68 =  5.9%
Effective 	 4/68 =  5.9%
Adequate	 5/68 =  7.4%
Ineffective 	54/68 = 79.4%
Pass Rush Score 8/68 = 11.8%

Team when he rushes:
Impact 		29/68 = 42.6%
Effective 	25/68 = 36.8%
Adequate	 7/68 = 10.3%
Ineffective	 7/68 = 10.3%
Composite Pass Rush Score 51/68 = 75%

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#71 DT Ahtyba Rubin:

Individual rush:
Impact 		 3/70 =  4.3%
Effective 	 9/70 = 12.9%
Adequate	11/70 = 15.7%
Ineffective	47/70 = 67.1%
Pass Rush Score 12/70 = 17.1%

Team when he rushes:
Impact 		23/70 = 32.9%
Effective 	27/70 = 38.6%
Adequate	11/70 = 15.7%
Ineffective	 9/70 = 12.9%
Composite Pass Rush Score 50/70 = 71.4%

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#67 DT Ishmaa'ily Kitchen:

Individual rush:
Impact 		 0/24 =  0%
Effective 	 5/24 = 20.8%
Adequate	 1/24 =  4.2%
Ineffective	18/24 = 75%
Pass Rush Score 5/24 = 20.8%

Team when he rushes:
Impact 		 5/24 = 20.8%
Effective 	10/24 = 41.7%
Adequate	 7/24 = 29.2%
Ineffective	 2/24 =  8.3%
Composite Pass Rush Score 15/24 = 62.5%

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THE 2013 SCORES

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Pass Rush Scores:

Paul Kruger		48.6%
Jabaal Sheard		32.2%
Armonty Bryant		31.9%
Desmond Bryant		29.4%
Barkevious Mingo	27.5%
Billy Winn		27.5%
John Hughes		22.2%
Ishmaa'ily Kitchen	20.8%
Ahtyba Rubin		17.1%
Phil Taylor		11.8%

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Composite Pass Rush Scores:

Armonty Bryant		91.5%
Jabaal Sheard		82.2%
Paul Kruger		78.4%
Desmond Bryant		75.4%
Phil Taylor		75.0%
Billy Winn		72.5%
Ahtyba Rubin		71.4%
Barkevious Mingo	71.3%
John Hughes		64.4%
Ishmaa'ily Kitchen	62.5%

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A Few Observations:

1. Some players have high Composite Rush Scores despite low Pass Rush Scores.

Phil Taylor is the most extreme example of this. Desmond Bryant nearly tripled his productivity on an individual level yet the team's numbers with them on the field are nearly identical. How is that? At first thought, I considered that Taylor may have received more double teams. It turns out that this was not the case:  Taylor was double-teamed on 43% of the plays I graded while Desmond Bryant was 44% of the time. Watching the tape, however, showed me that Taylor's biggest impact was in his ability to move his blockers laterally, often stringing them out wide and opening up gaps for others:

2. John Hughes and Ishmaa'ily Kitchen should be relegated to the base defense and run downs, if possible.

With Composite Pass Rush Scores more than ten percentage points lower than Desmond Bryant and Phil Taylor --not to mention a whopping twenty-five points lower than Armonty Bryant -- these guys do not belong on the field in obvious passing situations. Similarly, we should be careful how and when we use them versus teams that like to run a no-huddle offense, or else our secondary might get exposed while a poor pass rushing lineup is stuck on the field.

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3. Find ways to keep Armonty Bryant in the lineup.

That's what the numbers say. When Armonty is pass rushing, 91.5% of the time the team gets considerable pressure on the quarterback. A third of that time he's the one doing it. The rest? The space and chaos he creates along the offensive line helps his teammates. He drew double teams on 40% of his pass rush attempts, which is not far behind Taylor and Desmond Bryant. He's quite undersized to play his 3-4 defensive end and 4-3 under tackle positions, but he uses good leverage, quickness, flexibility, and balance, along with a relentless motor, to give his blockers fits.

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4. Paul Kruger is Mr. Reliable?

Paul Kruger had by far the best individual Pass Rush Score on the team last year at 48.6%, edging out second place Jabaal Sheard by sixteen percentage points. This may make it sound like he was a consistent producer coming off the edge, but that's not really the case. Kruger's production was highly influenced by the caliber of offensive tackles that he faced. For example, versus the mediocre Michael Oher and the Baltimore Ravens he posted a 63.3% Pass Rush Score and a 76.9% Pass Rush Score versus Jaguars Austin Pasztor while against Andre Smith of the Bengals he registered only a 25% Pass Rush Score.

Why the huge disparity? Last year, Paul Kruger primarily saw action as a left outside linebacker who faced a lot of single-team blocks by right tackles. He dominated matchups against unathletic waist benders and players lacking strength or toughness (Oher and Pasztor). In turn, he was stifled by stout tackles with good flexibility (Smith). Hmm, maybe there is consistency here. Kruger dominates favorable matchups and struggles in unfavorable ones.

As you can see in the above graphic, Kruger is a power rusher. He has a speed move (below) and he has a bull rush (above) but both rely heavily on him using his power to gain a leverage advantage. I'm of the opinion that the ideal position to play OLB Paul Kruger is right next to 3-4 DE Armonty Bryant. Kruger's strength can help protect Armonty in the run game. It can also open up opportunities in the pass rush: Kruger can take an inside move and attack the gap between the left tackle and left guard, using his power to collapse the edge, while Bryant uses his quickness and flexibility to loop around the corner on a stunt.

Here's Kruger on his speed rush. He quickly pushes Oher off balance and then turns into the backfield. Also take notice of Armonty Bryant's relentlessness on the play. He doesn't give up when his initial move fails, he actually completes three different moves on the play -- inside move, spin back outside, and then redirect back inside:

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Strength? Kruger holds off Dolphins tight end Charles Clay with one hand:

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5. Mingo had a rough rookie year...but don't count him out just yet.

Barkevious Mingo entered the league as an under-muscled, underweight speed rusher. Everybody wants those guys to dip, bend, flatten, and close...but that's not Mingo's game. He's a relatively stiff guy for the position that doesn't bend all that well and doesn't get very low. He can't contort his body like one of last year's NFL-sack-leading "Roberts" (Quinn or Mathis), so asking him to is not playing to his strengths. Keke is quick, fast, has long arms, and is reasonably tall at 6'4". If he had the necessary strength and mass, his frame would be well-suited for bull rushing. He does not. So what can he do?

Of the two recommendations on the above image, Mingo hasn't demonstrated the flexibility to dip low enough around the edge to get the best of most offensive tackles. He may be able to find success with the other: point your inside hip at the blocker, fight him off with your hands, and let your waist go loose so that the force of his block to your upper body doesn't transfer to your legs. In the image above, he's making the mistake of keeping his upper body rigid (which would be the right thing to do if he were a big bull rusher or if he was dipped low enough that blows glance off, but neither of those are the case). This makes his entire body function as a single unit: any push to his chest also affects his legs, his feet, and his path to the quarterback. If he relaxes his waist it will act as a fulcrum point where a lot of the force of a push to his upper body will just increase the angle of the bend between it and his legs and not affect his path around the corner (similar to how pushing the head of a bobblehead doesn't affect its body). In the picture above, his feet have Bengals left tackle Andrew Whitworth beaten, but his rigid upper body is holding them back and preventing him from getting pressure on the quarterback.

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